LEXINGTON ORAL HISTORY PROJECTS, INC.

Interview
Noam Chomsky
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Interview conducted by Norma McGavern-Norland
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NC: I'm Noam Chomsky. I live in Lexington, teach at MIT.

INT: How long have you been living in Lexington?

NC: We moved in early 1965 from Belmont, and earlier from Cambridge and Allston and Philadelphia. That's the origin.

INT: Well, the sixties being a time of much upheaval, yet there was not much going on in Lexington at that time. Were you involved in anything at that time?

NC: There were, in the early sixties, in the whole sort of Cambridge/Lexington area there were peace groups. I mean things like SANE or the committees that were opposing nuclear armament. The Stuart Hughes campaign had aroused some interest and involvement in places like Lexington but there wasn't anything very active until some time later. 1965, things were just beginning to get started, mostly around the colleges.

INT: And by 1971?

NC: By 1971 the world had changed quite a lot. By 1966 Boston—although many people forget it—Boston was a very pro-war city. It has a liberal reputation, but the fact of the matter is that it was impossible to have a public meeting in Boston without it being violently disrupted until late 1966. So the first major effort to have a demonstration against the [Vietnam] War was on October 15th, I think, 1965, which was an International Day of Protest. There was a meeting called on the Boston Common. I was supposed to be one of the speakers. I remember Russ Johnson, the American Friends Service Committee, was another. But there was no meeting. It was just violently disrupted. The only reason we

weren't lynched was that there were a couple of hundred cops around. The next day the Boston Globe devoted its entire front page to a denunciation of the demonstrators. The radio was just full of bitter attacks on people who dared to question whether the United States had a right to bomb some other country.

Senators like Senator Mansfield were denouncing the utter irresponsibility of people who questioned our leader. A real fascist tone. And this continued. In early 1966—I guess it must have been about March—when the next International Day of Protest was called we decided to have an inside rally instead of an outdoor one, just to cut down on violence. We decided to have it in a church, assuming that that would cut down on violence. So there was a demonstration called in the Arlington Street Church. There was an overflow to another church. And the church was attacked, defaced, you know, big mobs out there. In fact, the police sort of stood by quietly until finally the—I remember I happened to be standing next to the police captain when he was hit with a tomato or something—they quickly cleared the area. But it wasn't until late 1966 that it was possible even to appear in public without a serious threat of violence. Meanwhile, in special separate places, like at some of the colleges and so on, there was activity beginning. But for example, at MIT, say, there was no serious peace activity until late 1968.

However, by 1971 everything had changed. After the Tet Offensive in January 1968, elite groups—Wall Street and so on—decided that the war simply wasn't worth it any longer. The U.S. had achieved its major goals and pretty much destroyed the country. And it was becoming too costly for the U.S. economy. In part it was becoming costly because of the protest. The domestic protest had reached a point by then so that the Johnson Administration was unable to declare a national mobilization, which would

have been efficient. In the Second World War there was a national mobilization that was highly efficient. It essentially turned the country into a fascist state, which worked very well. The economy boomed, and so on. But in the Vietnam War there was just too much protest. And they had to do what they called the "guns and butter" policy. And that's economically quite inefficient, and it let to stagflation—a combination of stagnation and inflation.

The U.S. economic situation vis a vis our real enemies, Europe and Japan, was declining. So by about 1968, especially after the Tet offensive made it very clear that this was going to go on for a long time, the elite essentially called off the war. There were delegations to Washington that told Lyndon Johnson to quit and to withdraw, and a slow withdrawal policy started. However at the same time, then came the Nixon Administration, there were efforts, especially by [Secretary of State] Kissinger, to try to maximize the amount of destruction that was left behind. So there was a big attack on Laos. The war on Cambodia was just starting at full force in 1971. So while troops were withdrawing from Vietnam the war was in fact expanding to Laos and Cambodia. And it was still very brutal in Vietnam.

That's the situation by 1971. However, by that time there were very substantial protests. Probably two thirds—according to polls, at least—about two thirds of the population considered the war not just a mistake but grossly immoral. So that was a different mood. The mood had switched radically from 1966 to 1971.

INT: Would you say that that mood had changed enough in Boston that there was a different attitude toward protesting against the war?

NC: Oh, yes. By late 1966 it was already possible to have public meetings without concern for violent disruption. I should say that the violent disruption in the early years—1965 and 1966—was very often from

students who would sort of march over from universities en masse and break up the rallies and demonstrations. But that switched pretty quickly. I mean, it was never not an issue, of course. But for example, by 1967 the *Boston Globe* would not denounce people who protested the War, let's say.

INT: What was the mood in Lexington? As a resident of Lexington

NC: Well, actually, although I live here, my life is actually sort of elsewhere. I mean, I'm not here much. But my wife and children are much more here. So Carol probably told you when she took the kids to women's demonstrations in about 1965 or 1966 in places like Concord how they would get physically attacked— cans thrown at them and that sort of thing—not violence, but unpleasantness. And that was true throughout this area in about the same time. The mood in Lexington was not different from the *Boston Globe*. It's sort of Cambridge liberalism, you know. And as that shifted, so did the general mood. You could see it. I mean, if, to turn to another level, it takes an ADA—Americans for Democratic Action which is the sort of extreme liberal wing of the Democratic Party, and in fact (is) centered in places like Cambridge—that's where the Cambridge elite sort of runs it, you know, people who would be regarded as the ultra-liberals, that's ADA—as late as the fall of 1967, fall of 1967 ADA would not permit dissidents to join. Because they were afraid of them. They were afraid they'd speak against the war. I can give you details, if you'd like. For example, I myself, at one point—because at this point things were getting out of control—in Arlington, one of the local ADA chapters got out of the control of Cambridge liberals. It was being pretty much run by some local Italian trade unionists who turned it into a peace group. So they started inviting peace speakers, Howard Zinn and people like that. The ADA office didn't like that one bit. For one thing, because they were out of control, and for another thing, because it was a peace group. In September 1967

approximately the two…this Italian couple who was basically running this Arlington group, called me and called [Boston University Professor] Howard Zinn and asked us if we would join ADA. The reason was that they wanted to propose in the December 1967 meeting in Harvard, a state-wide meeting, they wanted to propose a withdrawal plan, you know, that ADA should call for the withdrawal from Vietnam. But they didn't feel that they could stand up in front of all those fancy Harvard professors and make a speech. So they asked us to join so we could speak for it.

Well, to join ADA involves, you send in five dollars and you're a member of ADA. So we sent in our, whatever it was, five dollars, and nothing happened. And weeks and weeks went by, and nothing happened. Finally, I got a call from the head of Massachusetts ADA who was a professor at Harvard, an apologetic call saying that he just wanted to apologize for the fact that they hadn't acted on our applications. And what he said, in effect, is that the whole state ADA is paralyzed, because they can't decide whether to accept our applications. The fear was that someone might stand up and say, "Let's withdraw from Vietnam," at a state-wide meeting. One morning I was sitting in my office and I got a phone call from Howard Zinn who's—I don't know if you know him—he's a very mild person. I've never seen him angry in all the years I've known him. But he was furious. He said that a delegation from ADA had just come to his office led by some prosecuting attorney, and had demanded that he withdraw his application. And they were very offensive about it. He just got angry and kicked them out of his office and withdrew his application. But he was telling me that they're probably coming to my office, and he said, "Think it through first" So I thought it through first, and I decided I was not going to withdraw.

Sure enough, they came to my office at MIT, a lot of big mucky-mucks

from State ADA, well-known people around here, I might say, including some personal friends, and they came to my office and they pleaded with me to withdraw my application. They didn't say why, but we both understood, we all understood why. They were afraid that someone might speak against the war at an ADA meeting, and that's not allowed. This was the fall of 1967, okay. I told them I was not going to withdraw. I said, if they didn't want to accept my application, that's up to them, but I wasn't going to withdraw it. Well, they left finally after a rather unpleasant half hour or so. Meanwhile, the December meeting came and went. Then a couple of weeks later the Tet Offensive happened, the end of January. At that point all the liberal elite switched sides completely, just the way Wall Street did. They recognized that this is not going to work. It's going to be too costly for us, since that's the only condition that matters; they switched sides. And of course after that they accepted my membership. But after that I didn't care anymore, because by then Wall Street financiers were going down to Washington and telling Lyndon Johnson to get lost, since at that time it was a different calculation of cost. But that's an indication of what the mood was like among the ultra-liberal sectors of Cambridge-type society as late as early 1968.

INT: Now amidst all these goings-on, Lexington (was in) many ways a peaceful little suburban island. Nonetheless, the same tensions no doubt existed there. You mentioned that in many ways you lived elsewhere in the world. What made you choose Lexington? Or was this something that just…what kind of a town was it to you at that time?

NC: Well, when my wife and I moved up here in around 1950, we were urban people. We lived in kind of middle class urban settings. And in fact, I had never been more than a couple of miles from home until I went to college. You know, virtually—that's a bit of an exaggeration—but hardly

more. We moved up to Boston. We lived in Allston, and then moved over to, you know, various, you know P_____ Street in Cambridge, kind of lower middle class urban settings. By the time we got mobile—you know, we would travel around the region—and Lexington looked to us like far west. We had this dream that someday we'll move out into the "far west" and kind of enjoy ourselves "in the plains of ——," you know, that sort of thing. Out here Lexington was a lot more rural in those days, I should say. But in fact it was still about like one-third farms in the 1950's. Especially from our urban kind of point of view, not very wealthy urban point of view, Lexington looked like a paradise, a rural paradise. So when we finally were able, when we had young kids and we were looking for good schools and the usual thing, we made the move. But that's Lexington. However, I don't really spend a lot of time here. I'm too busy with everything.

INT: What led you to get involve in the events that happened here at Lexington in 1971?

NC: Well, remember, I was extremely active in the anti-war movement for long before. In fact, I had been organizing resistance; I was in and out of jail. I was in fact pretty close to a long jail sentence myself. I was one of the people who organized national resistance. And I was in fact close to the VVAW, quite apart from this.

INT: Could you tell us what that potential long jail sentence might have been connected with?

NC: Yes, I was an un-indicted co-conspirator in the Spock[1] trial. And the reason I was un-indicted was because the government was so stupid and inefficient that they picked all the wrong people. It was an astonishing trial. It was quite interesting to see how totally incompetent the FBI and the Justice Department were.

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[1]Spock is Dr. Benjamin Spock, a nationally known pediatrician, author of a vastly popular book about

INT: Could you tell about this trial itself, the Spock trial?

NC: The Spock trial was around the end of December of 1967 or early 1968, roughly at that time. It was a trial of five people. It was a trial of five people for conspiracy to obstruct the Selective Service system. And what was really on trial was a group called Resist, a national resistance organization, of which I was one of the initial organizers and leaders, which was established in 1967 to support draft resisters and other political…it extended to other kinds of political activism around but started with support or draft resisters. I had even before that been organizing national tax resistance. But this was the first real national organization. And that organization had a public meeting in…must have been fall of 1967 in which there was a press conference in a New York hotel and we read a thing called, "Call to Resist Illegitimate Authority" and organized the national organization.

By late—well, I forget the exact dates—but sometime around then, a little time after that, the trial began. The government picked for the trial the people who were most visible. Actually what they did, they picked five people to put on trial. One was Ben Spock who was very visible. Another was Bill Coffin [William Sloane Coffin] who was then a Chaplain at Yale, who was also very visible. They [Justice Department and CIA] were either too stupid or too incompetent to understand that the reason they were visible was that whenever we'd have a press conference we would try to get Ben Spock and Bill Coffin there. And they were very forthcoming. They were quite willing to do it, because they knew that that would bring out the press. But that was about the limit of their involvement, appearance at press conferences.

They picked Mitch Goodman, an author, who in fact was involved in

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raising children.

Resist. They picked Mark Raskin who's the head of the Institute for Policy Studies. And the reason was that they mixed him up with Art Rasgow. They could never get the Jewish names straight. The government was completely confused. I was always being mixed up with Herschel Kaminsky right through the trial, and Mark Raskin was not the person they wanted. Art Rasgow was the person they wanted, but they had gotten confused. So Mark Raskin was there. And the fifth person they picked was Michael Ferber, who was a young draft resister, because they just had to have some draft resister in the group. And in fact, Michael Ferber was a student here. I had in fact…the trial was about two things. One, appearance at this press conference, and two, physically taking draft cards into the Justice Department in a protest in about October 1967. Those were the two crucial events in the conspiracy. Mike Ferber was in fact down there because I had flown down with him. In fact I carried the draft cards from Boston to Washington that were then carried into the Justice Department. The only reason the people who were picked, apart from their errors like Raskin for Rasgow, were people who had both been at the press conference and had walked into the Justice Department. Now the only reason I wasn't picked was I hadn't walked into the Justice Department. The reason was when they walked in I was kind of haranguing the crowd outside. But this is an indication of the level of competence of the trial. And in fact, the whole trial was just hilarious. They could never figure out what was going on.

Apparently the government was…the FBI was looking for our connections to North Korea or something like that, and therefore paid no attention to what was actually happening which was completely open, public. We didn't keep…there was no, there was nothing secret because we wanted to make it as public as possible. Apparently they couldn't believe it. So they disregarded everything that was public. You know, we'd have a

meeting in Town Hall, New York, and they'd disregard that. But apparently they kept looking for the hidden connections, you know, to the Communist conspiracy or something. Which is an indication of the government mentality. But in any event, the trial was…you know, they did actually succeed in sentencing them on the first round. But there were so many errors, it was very quickly overthrown on appeal. In the first day of the court trial the prosecuting attorney in his opening statement said that I would be the first person next on trial, the next round. As I say, the only reason I wasn't on the first round was because they were too incompetent to know who was really involved. They missed all the main organizers. In fact, most of them, they didn't know their names. All that was completely public, as I say. There was nothing secret about it. So that was all going on around late 1967 I guess.

If it hadn't been for the Tet Offensive, probably they would have proceeded with the trial. Incidentally, the Attorney General at the time was Ramsey Clark. He was the one who was prosecuting us. That's one indication of the changes that took place around that period. But it was a pretty wild period in any respect. I mean, these are examples. By the time the Lexington thing came, this was pretty tame I should say from my point of view. I participated in that of course, but it was just, you know, one more arrest.

INT: In fact the Lexington thing, it was much smaller scale than any of the things that you talked about before. Did you then get involved in it because it was there? You—it just happened to be something that you got involved in?

NC: Well, I was spending a huge amount of time in things of this kind. I was in and out of jail. I could easily give seven talks a day. I was very much involved. I had been closely involved with VVAW and the groups

that became VVAW before they became that. Around that time, 1970, veterans' groups were beginning to organize around the country.

INT: Did you know the leaders of them?

NC: I knew a lot of them, yes. And remember that the people who are called leaders are usually not the leaders. What I just described is typical. Every popular movement, as far as I know that ever existed, the people who actually did it are mostly unknown, and the people who are known are the people who sort of floated to the surface because, it needed someone visible. Take the Civil Rights movement. If you asked who was a leader of the Civil Rights movement, everyone will say Martin Luther King. And Martin Luther King certainly performed very valuable services. But the people who actually organized and led and ran the Civil Rights movement are SNCC [Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee] workers whose names nobody knows. They were the ones who were in the front lines every day, and they did all the work and set up a situation in which Martin Luther King could come to town and be very visible. And it's not that he was…you know, everyone understood this inside and appreciated it, and everyone thought that's a fine service. But that's not what it means to lead a movement.

It was the same with the VVAW. The actual organizers are people with many of whom I'm still in contact. They were doing things like organizing war crimes trials around the country and other activities, which led finally to the formation of the VVAW, Veterans Against the War. I think this must have been one of the early organized activities as a group.

INT: Had you known about what their plans were and what this was part of, what it meant to demonstrate?

NC: I wouldn't swear that I knew this particular thing. But it's very likely because I had pretty close contacts with a lot…I was giving talks for

them and appearing at their affairs and doing all sorts of things, and had been for some time.

INT: Did you know any of the organizers who came to Lexington?

NC: Well, my memory is hazy on that. I'm sure I was in contact with them, but I don't really remember the details. I should stress again that this was just one of hundreds of things that I was doing of the same nature at the same time. It was constant, absolutely constant.

INT: When did you actually stumble onto this? Exactly what…at what part of the weekend did you…?

NC: Did I get involved?

INT: …find yourself on the Green?

NC: I knew—as soon as I knew that there was going to be any problem—I knew that I was going to be there. Because I always was. And so whenever it turned out that there was going to be an…whenever it was discovered that there was going to be an encampment and that the Selectmen didn't agree to it, of course I just went as I did to all such things.

INT2: Now normally—can I jump in here?—normally Carol, your wife, probably wasn't at many of the things?

NC: That's right.

INT: And then this one she was. So that would be…?

NC: That was different, yes.

INT2: How did that work?

NC: Well, we had a kind of division of labor. For one thing, it looked at that time as if I was going to end up in jail for a couple of years. So she had other things to worry about, like going back to college and getting her degree and taking care of the kids and so on. And I…

INT: Your children were how old at that time? Quite young?

NC: About eleven…roughly eleven, eight and one, I guess. Sort

of…maybe I'm a year off, but something like that. It was extremely demanding. I mean, at that time it was literally a full-time life just being involved in peace movement activities. And very tense also. I mean, the issues were intense. And the confrontations were constant. There was a lot of emotion, for quite good reasons. And by then it was incidentally spreading to other issues.

So by that time there was already a good deal of organizing in the urban ghettoes. The Black Panthers had been organized. Other groups were involved. And many of us, including me, were involved in that, too. So that kind of thing was going on. I remember not long after that…in fact, just before that, in December 1969, the FBI had been involved in an assassination of a leading Black Panther organizer in Chicago. That was kind of a Gestapo-style assassination in which he was murdered in bed, apparently, possibly drugged after an FBI plant had got the Chicago police to break in there. These were not quiet days. Lots of things were happening. And this was…getting involved in this was just like a reflex, but it was a very mild example of things going on. For one thing, there was a supportive community. I've never seen such a peaceful arrest in my life. It was very gentlemanly and so on. It wasn't…

INT: Tell us about it.

NC: Well, the arrest was, you know, "Sorry to have to bother you, but would you mind getting on the bus?" It wasn't mace and…I mean, I have been involved in things like that, where the police are trying to kill you, not very…right around that time. Let me see, this was—what was the date of this one again?

INT: May 30, 1971.

NC: Okay. That was right about the time of May Day.

INT: May 30?

NC: I forget the exact timing, but this was probably right after May Day in Washington.

INT: May first?

NC: Yes. And May Day in Washington, the police were trying to kill you. You know, I had been down there with a group. We would sit in the…they were trying to kind of shut down Washington, you know. So you sit in the middle of the street, and police cars would come roaring at you. And they looked like they're going to kill you, you know. People were getting maced and beaten and ten, twelve thousand people tossed into jail, and that sort of thing. By comparison, this was a tea party, you know.

INT: Well this was after the Calley verdict[2] too, I believe, that had happened earlier this year. So public opinion had taken yet another step.

NC: Yes. I should say that the Boston demonstrations were also quite violent. Boston Police, for various reasons, were pretty brutal in the way they treated demonstrators, especially students. Especially ones with long hair or looking a little odd or something like that.

INT: What had been the attitude in Lexington to people with long hair and strange attitudes?

NC: Well, I don't…I'm not a good judge about Lexington attitudes. I don't know it that well. But I'm sure that…I know for a fact that the police, for example, were keeping teenagers under pretty close surveillance. They had informants in the schools. They knew who was taking drugs, who was talking to whom and that sort of thing. I know from personal cases where someone got into trouble, that there was a whole network of informers, surveillance and so on and so forth. So there was obvious…I mean, I don't

[2] Lieutenant William Calley was convicted of murder for his role in the March 1968 My Lai massacre. Calley ordered the men of Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, American Division to shoot everyone in the village. He himself rounded up a group of villagers, ordered them into a ditch, and then mowed them down with machine gun fire. Sentenced to life in prison, Calley was seen as a scapegoat for the Army's failure to instill morale and discipline in its troops. Upon appeal, his sentence was reduced and he was

know the details. But plainly there was a fair amount of sort of low level surveillance at least going on. Now this is an upper middle class town, and that means people are protected from violence.

In a society like ours, you can buy your freedom, basically. There's a lot of freedom for sale. And you can buy it. And if you're rich, you can buy a lot of it, and if you're poor you can't buy any of it. That's capitalist society. Everything's a commodity, including freedom. And we're rich out here so we buy a lot of freedom so the police don't harass you and that sort of thing.

INT: What do you think motivated the Board of Selectmen to behave the way they did?

NC: I wouldn't know. I have no idea who they were, and I don't know enough about town politics. But I'm sure that they were caught [in a bind]. It was a tense time. I mean, do you support state power or do you…it's very rare for a population to dissent. I mean, the United States is quite unusual in countries around the world in the level of dissidence, popular dissidence. The kind of popular dissidence that's not uncommon in the United States would be suppressed very quickly in most countries, including what are called democratic countries.

INT: Then it didn't surprise you that they took this attitude?

NC: The Selectmen? No. In fact what I thought was surprising at that time…I should say when I got seriously involved in what was later to become the peace movement there was virtually nothing…I couldn't believe that there would ever be more than ten of us in the country. In the early days, 1964, 1965, when I would give talks around here, say, it could be a talk in a church with four people, you know, and one drunk guy who wandered in, two people who wanted to kill you, and the fourth, the organizer. We would have meetings in the colleges in early 1965 in which

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eventually released from prison in 1974.

we would call a meeting on Iran, Venezuela, Vietnam, the price of something or other, in order to try to get more people and organizers. Things changed very quickly in about 1966, 1967. It changed from enormous hostility to substantial participation but in selected sectors—mostly young people, mostly college students. There was still plenty of hostility elsewhere. So the country was split by 1967. It wouldn't surprise me that the Selectmen would reflect that internal conflict. There are very few countries where popular dissidence is regarded as acceptable behavior. You're supposed to obey orders. You're supposed to follow what the leader tells you. That's the general way in which authoritarian societies work. And ours is authoritarian.

INT: How would you characterize the gathering on the Green compared with other events that you'd been involved in? Was its nature any different? How?

NC: Well, for one thing, it was completely peaceful. It was very supportive. There was no tension. It was obvious that nothing unpleasant was going to happen. I mean, the worst thing that would happen would be we'd spend the night in a room somewhere instead of at home. And there was a supportive environment. First of all, you were with veterans. Who could be against being with veterans? And there was a good, kind of a good feeling about it. People felt they were doing the right thing. They were doing the right thing. It was a little bit out of the ordinary. It's not what ordinary middle class people do.

INT: It was an untypical representation of people—young, old?

NC: Well, it was old, much older than usual. My recollection of it is, it was mostly people with children, people in their, I don't know, forties or something like that. Which is not the usual demonstration. The usual demonstration was college students and a mixture of other people, of older

people around. This was quite the opposite. I don't recall very many young people around.

INT: Do you feel that said something about the state of protest of…?

NC: Sure. That was a time at which opposition to the war had in fact spread quite substantially. I mean, this was at a time, for example, when—well, just to say, take the *Boston Globe*—it's kind of a reflection of sort of the rural community in this region. It was already quite anti-war. The *Boston Globe* in late 1969 I think had an editorial calling for a withdrawal from Vietnam. It was the first one in the country. The son of the editor of the *Boston Globe* was a resister himself who I knew well. And things had changed.

INT: Can I ask another question about the nature of the involvement in the peace movement in general and then relating to what was happening in 1971 here? What about the role of the clergy? Since you were involved so much and…what was it in general?

NC: Again, it's very different from what it is today. The clergy in the 60's was still very hawkish for the most part. It changed in the 70's and 80's. But by now the churches, large segments of the church are right in the forefront of all kind of roughly peace movement activities.

INT: Right now, in the 1990's?

NC: In the 1980's. But remember, as far as the Catholic Church was concerned, this was just the beginning of the time when the Latin American bishops were beginning to shift, make a really historic shift in the nature of the church. Something very important happened in the Catholic Church in the 60's and the 70's, what we call liberation theology. But it largely came from the Latin American church. Not entirely, but that was the forefront. And they turned towards what was called the preferential option for the poor. That is, instead of the church being an organization which would

defend the rich, which is what it had been all of its history, they would be concerned with poor people and their needs. Now that had a tremendous effect in Latin America.

In fact, what the bishops were doing was a reflection of what priests and nuns and lay workers and so on had already been doing, namely trying to organize in peasant communities and setting up Christian-based communities and so on. By the 1970's that spread through Central America. In fact, the reason why the U.S. launched this huge terrorist campaign in Central America in the past ten years, which just devastated the place, was primarily to destroy the church. This was a U.S. war against the church in the 1980's. That's not accidental that the decade is framed by the assassination of Archbishop Romero in 1980 and the assassination of the six Jesuit intellectuals in 1989. That's symbolically what the decade was about. And that reflected itself here. I mean, the churches in the United States also changed considerably. Also the Protestant churches, which had always been somewhat mixed.

But their involvement in something like the analog to the Catholic preferential option for the poor, that also took place. So you had, by the 1980's, when the peace movement were much broader and much more deeply rooted in the population than they were in the 60's, it was not Boston any longer and it wasn't the colleges any longer. It's Midwest, Southwest. When I travel around giving talks, if I go to Manhattan, Kansas, I find a more active and more knowledgeable peace group in the basement of a church than you'd find in Cambridge because the thing had just shifted, and the churches were quite influential. I just came back from Alaska, giving a talk in Anchorage. There's a Central American group in Anchorage which is partially church-based, which is very knowledgeable, very active.

That kind of thing was unheard of in the 60's. But the churches at that

time, the leadership of the churches was, for the most part, pretty hawkish. There were individuals who were not. Like Paul Coffin, for example, or Jack Mendelssohn who I think was at that time the minister at Arlington Street Church. I think it was Mendelssohn. So there were scattered individuals. But for the most part, the church was still pretty hawkish at that period.

INT: I think perhaps Lexington wasn't a very typical situation since there were clergy people…

NC: Involved?

INT: …involved in that in 1971.

NC: Well, you know, that was just about the transition period. Around that time, both the Catholic Church and the Protestant churches were switching. And in Latin America—dramatically. Which would of course, influence things here. They're not dissociated. Also, this was the time that Pope John the 23rd was still the Pope, and he changed the Church a lot, from the brief period when he was there.

INT: To jump up to now, I wonder what you think about the role of dissent these days? The world is a very different place than it was then. It seemed so clearly the right thing to do at that time. Can you imagine, can you see circumstances in which people would unite in the way they did at that time?

NC: Well, see, maybe they're disillusioned about that. I think the 80's have been much more active than the 60's, much more.

INT: Can you talk about that a little?

NC: Sure. I mean, I can see it a lot, because I still spend a lot of my life on this. In fact, more than ever. In fact, I can't begin to keep up with the requests for talks and that sort of thing around the country. What has happened is that the dissidence in the 60's was pretty narrowly focused. It

was mostly coming from young people, and mostly college students, and had a scattering of sort of elite universities. Not all, of course. There were other things happening. There was organizing in the ghettoes, there was the beginning of the women's movement. There were lots of things happening all over the place. A big ferment. But the visible protest, what people think of as dissent, was quite narrow. By the 1970's that had broadened considerably. These movements that began to be organized in the '60's began to take root. And you got a really large-scale feminist movement and environmentalist movement and so on and so forth.

By the 80's it spread still more. The Central American Solidarity movements are beyond anything that had ever existed in American history or I think anywhere. I don't know of any case anywhere that corresponds, that compares, with the Central American Solidarity movements. By the 1980's it was not just protest. It was people giving their lives to…sort of… Take Witnesses for Peace. These are people who went and lived in villages that were under the attack of U.S.-run terrorist forces to try to protect them from violence there. Nobody dreamt of that during the Vietnam War. There was nothing like the Witnesses for Peace. Most of it was coming out of churches.

And it's not particularly in places like Boston and New York. You don't see it so much here. You see it in Middle America—Midwest, Southwest. The Southwest is where the sanctuary movement began. So it spread into completely different sectors of the population. And it's much, much broader. You could see that even in the Gulf War. The Gulf War is the first time ever that I can recall when protests preceded the outbreak of war.

I remember the Vietnam protests didn't take place until we had been…John F. Kennedy started, sent the U.S. Air Force to bomb South Vietnam thirty years ago. Just nobody even remembers it. But it's now the

thirtieth anniversary. Late '61, early '62. That's when the U.S. Air Force was sent to bomb South Vietnamese villages. Protest was zero. You couldn't get two people in a living room to talk about it. If we want to bomb South Vietnamese villages, that's our right, I mean, you know.

Nowadays, that's impossible. In fact, it has reached the point where the government is well aware of it, or they know that classical intervention has been pretty much abandoned because there's just too much domestic protest. Actually there was a interesting leak from a Bush Administration secret document just the day that the ground attack opened in Iraq, there was a little leak hidden away that—most people missed it—but it was quite interesting. It was an early Bush administration document from February, around early 1989, kind of a review of the world situation by the C.I.A. and the Pentagon Intelligence and so on. And the section that was leaked had to do with what they call Third World threats. And what it said is, in the case of a confrontation with a much weaker enemy—which is of course the only kind we fight—in the case of a confrontation with a much weaker enemy, we must not only defeat them, but defeat them decisively and rapidly. Because anything else will undercut political support, understood to be very thin. Meaning classical intervention. So you know, you send the Marines out to occupy Haiti for twenty years, or a couple of years chase around after Saddam [Hussein] and that sort of thing. That's forgotten. It's not even an option. Huge aggression of the kind that Kennedy and Johnson carried out in Vietnam is not considered an option. The only thing that's possible is either clandestine terror, which is what the U.S. did in the 80's and they hope nobody will notice, or sudden, rapid, decisive victories over a completely defenseless enemy, over in days, against somebody who can't shoot back, like the Iraq War. Those are the only options that are even possible.

Well, that's a reflection of changes in the population. Very significant changes that have taken place since the 60's and have expanded considerably through the 80's. And it's very striking in many ways. I mean, take this famous gender gap. That's an indication. If you go back to the 60's, men and women were approximately the same in their attitudes towards the use of violence and terror. They all thought it was fine. Of course it's called defense, but we know every country calls its aggression defense. By the 1980's, or you take say around the time of the Iraq War, there was already a very…through this period there started to develop what's called the gender gap. I think by the eighties it was probably like twenty, twenty-five percent difference in responses on the part of men and women towards basically the use of violence. Well, that's a reflection of something that happened, namely, the growth of the feminist movement. When there are popular movements which enable people to get together a little bit, not just be complete atoms—you know, isolated—the effect is that their natural instincts get mutually supported, and you end up having opposition to terror and aggression and torture and so on. That's called the Vietnam Syndrome. Elite groups are very angry about it, naturally. But it happened, it happened not only among women, but strikingly there, and other sectors, too.

By now, for example—I mean, I can just see in my own experience—the kind of talks that I couldn't give to peace movement groups in the late 60's I can now easily give to any audience in the country; in the most reactionary section of the country there's a thousand people showing up. Maybe people don't agree, but at least we're sort of in the same moral universe. That was not true in the 60's at all. I don't cut corners at all when I give talks anymore. I just say exactly what I think. And in the late 60's I couldn't do that.

INT: So there's a healthy [amount] of dissent?

NC: Oh, much healthier than before, yes.

INT: At the same time the dissent is more splintered, is it not?

NC: Well, this is the United States. It's a very anarchistic kind of society. There's very little in the way of organization. So you can go to a place like, say, Detroit and there will be a meeting with groups from around Detroit who are doing exactly the same thing and don't even know about one another. There's little in the way of structure, you know. To the extent there's any structure at all it comes from things like the churches or a few organizations that try to keep themselves together. But there's lots of kind of local activity. And there's an atmosphere of dissidence. There's a willingness to question that's far beyond what there was thirty years ago

The U.S. institutional system, you know…the United States has always had a problem. It's a very free country. I mean, people are very independent, they're hard to control. And that has always required, it has always been understood that that requires very intensive propaganda. Because, obviously, people should not be permitted to participate in the democratic system. That's why I say ADA was so frightened at the idea that somebody might bring out an anti-war resolution. You're supposed to follow orders. And I mean, all elites understand this.

Now if you don't have…you can't control people by force; you've got to control them in some other way. So you have to control, you have to control opinion and thought and belief and so on. And you have to also keep people separated from one another. Very important that they not organize. Because if people become, get together, they find that "I'm not the only person in the world with these crazy ideas," and then you start to do something.

So the way in which the U.S. sort of roughly doctrinal system is set up,

it's essentially designed to keep people entirely isolated and to insure [that], and it has intensive propaganda and indoctrination. And I think that's a reflection of the freedom of the country. But you can see the results. I mean, we don't have unions, we don't have political clubs. And in fact, you can see it right now in what's going on in the primaries. Take a look at what's called democracy in the country; let's take say New Hampshire where they just had the primary. So what's called democracy is five guys go into a town, and they say I'm going to do X, Y and Z. And everybody who's listening to them knows there isn't a chance in the world they're going to do anything they say. And then they say vote for me, because I'm going to do X, Y and Z. That's called democracy.

Now there's another possibility, which isn't even in anybody's mind. And that is, five guys go into a town and they say, tell me what you have worked out in your political clubs and political organizations; what you in this town think ought to happen in this country. And the people in the town ought to say, well, here is our idea about what ought to happen in the country. Here's what we think about health insurance. Here's what we think about, you know, the Pentagon budget or whatever. And if you're…and they tell the candidate, if you're willing to do what we tell you, we'll vote for you. But of course if you stray from what we tell you, we'll kick you out. Well, that would be democracy. But that is so far from anyone's conception, you can't even imagine it. That's a propaganda victory. I mean, when you've driven out of people's minds the idea that democracy could even exist, then that's a tremendous victory for elites. And a lot of our system from the school…you know, it starts in kindergarten, goes right through the schools, universities, the media, etc. is all directed to driving out of people's minds the idea that democracy could exist, so that they accept complete subordination. Now the other part of it is to try to keep them

occupied elsewhere. So an enormous amount of propaganda in media is just to distract people. You know, have them watching sitcoms or football games or something or other. Anything except doing something that might involve them in managing their own affairs. And a huge amount of goes into this. I mean, the public relations industry along spends probably billions of dollars a year on this sort of thing.

INT: Aren't these choices that some of us make ourselves in a sense to take back… To go back to this, this event, many people don't particularly want to remember it or talk about it or think it should be recorded. That's one of the reasons that we thought it should be. Would you put that on the fact that officially people feel it should not be remembered, it's something to be covered over, forgotten because that's where history should be dealt with? Or that this is a more human kind of feeling, that if people feel uncomfortable about something they said or did and it doesn't look that good looking back on it, that maybe we shouldn't focus on it?

NC: No, I would look at it another way. We are deeply indoctrinated with the idea that people should be passive and obedient. The ideology is, you should be passive, obedient, follow orders and not raise your head. Your job as a human being is to consume and to produce and to watch the television set—period. Anything you do beyond that, you're getting out of line. This starts in elementary school. I mean, if a kid in elementary school is too independent, say doesn't want to do what he's told or something like that, there's a name for it—that's a behavior problem. It's not something to be applauded if somebody's independent. It's a problem we've got to do something about. And it goes all the way through. Now people are really deeply indoctrinated with this. So the fact that…I mean, it's a fact that people spontaneously in Lexington got together and did something that they weren't ordered to do, in fact, they were told not to do. And that's

frightening, especially to elites, who want people to be obedient. So of course you try to suppress it. And certainly I should say, there's nothing secret about this. If you want to see what elite thinking is really like among liberals, you should take a look at some of the things they write. So for example, not long after this, about 1975 a book came out, really one of the most important books in American political history I think. It's called "The Crisis of Democracy." It's the first major publication by the Trilateral Commission, which is basically an informal organization of relatively liberal, corporate and other elites from Europe, Japan and the United States, hence, trilateral. And the person who wrote the American part was Samuel Huntington, who's a professor at Harvard. They all said roughly the same thing. There was a crisis of democracy in the 60's and we've got to do something about it. The crisis was that people were beginning to participate in the political arena. So there was…the normally passive and apathetic groups were beginning to do something to get together to organize, to make demands, to have proposals, to try to advance them and so on.

Now if you're naive you might think that's democracy, but if you're sophisticated you know that's a crisis of democracy that has to be overcome. And the group decides various…then there comes a discussion—in fact the American contributor, Samuel Huntington, compares this with what he calls the good old days, before the crisis. And he says, in the good old days President Truman was able to run the country with the advice of a few Wall Street lawyers and financiers. That's his phrase. Now at that point, there was no crisis of democracy. Things were working exactly the way they're supposed to. A couple of Wall Street lawyers and financiers get together and they make policy and everybody else watches the NFL or something. That's democracy.

But in the 60's you began to have these problems, and things like the

Lexington Green was one of them. So naturally you want to suppress it. And there's been a major effort, major propaganda effort since the 70's to try to overcome this crisis of democracy. Now remember, these are the liberal elites. This is the group that Jimmy Carter came out of. In fact, he was picked by them as President. His entire cabinet came from that group. We're talking about the liberal wing. And you go over to the so-called conservatives who aren't conservatives of course—radical statists of the Reagan-Bush variety—it's much harsher. But this is the sort of softer side of the Establishment. The idea that people should actually become involved is very frightening. And this is quite explicit all the way back.

INT: Can I ask how…to localize that, that concept—you call it elite thinking or elite philosophy—do you believe that people who are involved in politics at the local level, civic politics like running a town, just naturally become indoctrinated into that thinking?

NC: Well, you know, it's not a hundred percent. And we don't have a totalitarian state. We have a very weak state comparatively to other countries. By and large you don't get advanced into the next level whether it's university or corporation or town politics or whatever unless you've already internalized the values. People who don't internalize the values tend to get weeded out. And as I say, that happens in elementary school. Just take a look at what happens in schools. It's a good example. Any one of us who went through school and went to a good college knows exactly how we did it, if we're honest. We did it by being obedient. Every time some teacher gave us some idiotic assignment which we knew was totally ridiculous, we went ahead and did it anyway, because we want to get to the next stage. Okay. Now there are people who don't do that. There are kids who say, that's an idiotic assignment; I'm not going to do it. Or I think the teacher is a fool; I'm going to do something else. Now that's intellectual

independence. But we don't encourage that. That's considered a problem that has to be overcome. What we want to train people for is obedience and submissiveness.

And in fact, I travel around a lot to colleges and give talks. And you can sort of see a difference. I mean, when you get to the more elite universities you get more submissive and obedient people. I think if all of us come from roughly the same backgrounds, if we think over our own histories, we'll understand it. Because that's the way we got ahead. How did we get ahead into the fancy colleges and the good jobs and so on? By doing what people told us. Knowing that it was a ridiculous thing to do, but that's the way you do it. The people who don't do it end up driving a taxicab. Now, and the same thing goes on right through graduate school and into the professions and so on. There's a sort of a filtering system which eliminates what is threatening, and what's threatening is independence and creativity. Now there are conflicts. So, for example, in the sciences, you just have to have independence and creativity, or you'll have nothing. So that's why a place like MIT is a very free university in many respects, because you just have to support, you have to encourage independence. In more ideological universities like, say, Harvard, which is not that far away, you don't need that much independence and creativity, because it's mostly…I mean, you do in the sciences. But in the ideological components of it, what you really need is obedience. And in fact you can sense the difference. For example, over the last thirty years almost, the faculty peace movement activity almost always came out at MIT. MIT has a much more conservative faculty. If you looked at the votes, they'd be way to the right of Harvard. But it's a much more independent place in many respects. And I think that that reflects these differences. You see them all over the place. If you go into say, journalism—if a young reporter, or an older reporter, for that matter,

decides to pursue a course that is contrary to the interests of established power, he or she will very likely be called in and say, you're getting too emotional, or why don't you go to the police court for a while, and that sort of thing. And if they continue to do it, they usually are cut out.

INT: So the system is self-censoring?

NC: The system is self-constraining, but that makes sense. Every institution is going to protect itself. And the way an institution protects itself is by weeding out people who might threaten them. And if it's an authoritarian—all institutions are somehow authoritarian; there's a command structure—and the more authoritarian they are, the more they want to eliminate dissidence. So it's quite understandable. In a country like this it's very visible, even more visible than elsewhere. Because we don't have the powerful state that can control you. At least if you're relatively wealthy you're immune from state control.

INT: I'm curious about what in your own life led you to your attitudes about dissidence and participatory democracy, coming out of the same middle class system that I guess most of the rest of us have.

NC: Well, first of all, it's partly age. I grew up in the Depression. And my earliest childhood memories are people coming to the door trying to sell rags to survive, and taking a trolley car and going past a textile factory in downtown Philadelphia where the police are just beating up women strikers and that sort of thing. These Depression images are very much in my mind. A lot of my family was—not parents, but close uncles and aunts and that sort of thing—were mostly unemployed workers at that time. At that time I remember there was a lively working class culture which is gone. One of the real achievements of American indoctrination has been to eliminate almost entirely the independent working class culture with its values, its solidarity and cooperation and so on. That was alive at that time.

Unemployed workers like my relatives, many of whom had never gone to school, never got past fourth grade, were very educated, self-educated of course, and read books and went to concerts and argued about everything, and so on and so forth. There was also a lot of political activism. So this late 1930's period when I was ten years old, but sort of old enough to sort of get a picture of it, had a big impact. In fact, I don't think I've really changed my political attitudes very basically since I was about ten years old. Obviously I know more now, but…

INT: Was there encouragement in your family for that?

NC: Well, my parents were more or less conventional Roosevelt liberals. And by the time I was an early teenager I was pretty much outside of that framework. But yeah, it was…for one thing political dissidence was taken for granted at the time. It was a lot…this is right before…it changed with the Second World War. Once the War came everything just clamped down on everything. But up until the war, things were…a lot of lively activity going on in the country. I mean, the CIO organizing and, you know, all sorts of things. The first article I wrote was in the school newspaper, right after the fall of Barcelona. And it was an anti-fascist article. I mean, I don't know whether I knew at the time, but I remember writing it and being concerned about the Spanish Civil War which was a significant event. And then just sort of went on from there.

INT: What do you think is the difference between the response to the Gulf War and the response to Vietnam? Also the response of the government to protests regarding the Gulf War and the response to protests regarding Vietnam?

NC: Yes, that's an interesting comparison. The response to the Gulf War was much more active and the protest was much greater than in the case of the Vietnam War. And I say, this is I think the first time in history that

there have ever been large protests before a war broke out. I remember the big protests in the Gulf War, like the big marches and so on, were planned well before the war started. It happened that they took place a week or two after, but that was just timing. There were protests against the Gulf War almost by September and October of 1990, when it was just imminent. And the big protests were in January, planned in December, before the war started. As I mentioned, in the case of the Vietnam War, it was about four or five years after the U.S. bombing of South Vietnam before any real protest developed. And say, what I was describing in 1966, that's four years after the U.S. had started bombing South Vietnam, we were still unable to have public protests. In fact to this day no one in the United States is allowed to say the words "U.S. attack on South Vietnam." I've been looking for thirty years now in the newspapers and the journals and so on. You can't see the phrase. We cannot face up to the fact that the U.S. attacked South Vietnam, although that's precisely what happened. Just as much as the Russians attacked Afghanistan. Well, you know, that's an indication of success of indoctrination that no totalitarian state could come close to. And it reflects the lack of dissidence at the time. The population generally was quite willing to accept the idea that when we attack another country we're defending…as I say, totalitarian states rarely achieve this result, and certainly never achieve it over a long stretch, unlike in Russia. They, the people could understand that they were invading Afghanistan, even though they were being told they were defending it. Here you can't understand that. Now the case of the Gulf War was quite different. The protest preceded the war—first time in history that I can think of. And the war had to be fought exactly the way the Bush Administration did and said in its private documents. It had to be rapid, decisive victory over a defenseless enemy. And that's what happened. It was over almost instantly.

It was preceded by a major propaganda effort to frighten the American population, make them cower in terror before this monster that's going to conquer the world. That worked for a short period. People really were scared. As I say, I travel around a lot, and I made a particular effort to go to the most reactionary parts of the country I could in February, right in that month, just to see what it was like. And people were cowering in terror.

This is surely the most frightened country in the world. In fact, it's an object of ridicule in Europe when they talk about how Americans are burrowing in holes, you know. But…which is quite true. It's a very frightened country. And we're subject to constant intimidation and so on. It goes all the way to the comic strips. I happened to open the comic strips in the *Boston Globe* the other day. There's this strip there called Spiderman, which is doing a repeat of the Gulf War. I've been reading it ever since out of curiosity. There's some madman who runs a little country who's developed some means of destroying the world. And I suppose Spiderman is going to say, listen, in the last minute or something. But this is a comic strip version of what everybody is being fed constantly. It used to be Russians. They're not good anymore. They're out of the game. So now it's Third World maniacs who are going to take over. And we've got to take over, and we've got to cower in terror, and then our grand leader will rescue us just…that's the way it goes. That was done, and it worked for a couple of weeks. People were terrified enough that when the miraculous victory took place we could all sing odes to our leader. But that's the only way you can carry off a war these days. So I think what all of this reflects is the much higher level of dissidence than over the last thirty years, which continues.

It's kind of interesting to watch, to read closely the way the so-called conservative intellectuals write about this. What's this Vietnam Syndrome,

say? It's an interesting phrase if you think about it. I mean, a syndrome is a disease, right? Some kind of disease out there. And it's spread over the country. What's the disease? Well, it was defined pretty neatly by one of the leading Reaganite intellectuals, Norman Podhoretz, who's the editor of *Commentary*. He called it "the sickly inhibitions against the use of military force." Now that's a real disease. There are people around who don't like to torture others, who don't like to bomb villages and so on. And those are sickly inhibitions from the point of view of… You could pull that right out of the Nazi archives, incidentally. But that's elite opinion. That's why people talk about the Vietnam Syndrome. They want to kick it, you know, so we won't have these sickly inhibitions anymore, and we could go back to the days when you could send the Air Force to bomb South Vietnamese villages and everybody would applaud. And that won't happen. I think the difference between the Gulf War and the Vietnam War illustrates this pretty dramatically.

INT: I had a question about, what were some of the reasons for attacking Vietnam? Like with the Gulf War, the reason was to protect Kuwait from Iraq and from Saddam Hussein.

NC: That was the official reason. It wasn't the actual reason.

INT: What the government was saying to people?

NC: That was what they were saying, yes. Well, back in the Vietnam days, you read, say, John F. Kennedy's speeches—we were defending ourselves or Vietnam from what was called the assault from within. There was an assault from within Vietnam, South Vietnam; namely, an assault against the government that we had imposed by force. And we were defending South Vietnam against the assault from within. That was Kennedy's phrase. Adlai Stevenson, who was the Ambassador to the United Nations, said we were defending it from internal aggression—an interesting

concept that was developed at that time. Internal aggression means when the population of some country carries out aggression against us, you know. So if the people of South Vietnam carry out aggression against us, that's internal aggression. Now everyone agreed that there was no external aggression. We were the only external force there. So we were defending it from internal aggression and the assault from within. The idea is, we're defending freedom and democracy and all kind of wonderful things from what were called Viet Cong. That was a propaganda term made up by the United States. It has a bad connotation in Vietnamese. It means Communists. We were defending South Vietnam against these internal guerrillas; then comes a whole story about how they're being supported by North Vietnam and the Russians and the Chinese, and the Russians are trying to take over the world, and so on and so forth. So there's a big, elaborate story about it. In fact, the reason why we have to change the propaganda system now is because the Russians aren't there any longer. So we, when we invaded Panama a year or two ago we couldn't pretend that we were defending Panama from the Russians. I mean, you couldn't find a Russian anywhere. So we were defending ourselves that time from—and defending Panama from—the arch-maniac Noriega who was going to conquer the world by sticking drugs in everybody's arm, or something like that. There's always some story or other. In fact, you go back in American history, it's been this way back to Colonial times. Right before the Bolshevik Revolution, like in 1916, Woodrow Wilson invaded Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Haiti has never recovered. Part of the problems they have now are from that twenty-year American occupation. And at that time you couldn't be defending yourself from the Russians. There's no Russians. So we were defending ourselves from the Huns who were going to conquer us. Before that, we were defending ourselves from the British. And this

goes all the way back. When Andrew Jackson conquered Florida around 1820 with great enthusiastic support by Thomas Jefferson and others we were defending ourselves from the British who were inspiring savages and Negro slaves to attack us, so therefore we had to defend ourselves by conquering Florida. When we stole a third of Mexico in the 1840's, it was to protect ourselves from the machinations of the British who were going to try to do this and that and the other. There was a lot of hatred for the British in those days because they were in our way, they were strong. So you had to defend, or maybe the British would do something if we didn't conquer the whole west. It goes all the way back. If you read—nobody bothers to read the Declaration of Independence—you sort of memorize it, but you don't read it. It's like a holy text. But if you actually bothered reading it, you'll notice that it tells how terrible King George III of England is. It's kind of an indictment of George III for all of the awful things he did. One of them goes like this: "He unleashed against us the merciless Indian savages whose known way of warfare was to murder women and children." Well, the fact of the matter is, as the authors of that document knew, it was the murderous European savages who were unleashed against the Native Americans, and who had to teach them that the way you fight a war is, you wait until the braves leave the village, and then you go in and you wipe everybody out. That intimidates them. That's a lesson that had to be taught to these domestic people. No, you know, maybe today people have forgotten it. But Thomas Jefferson remembered it, because it was happening right in his day. But nevertheless we were defending ourselves from the merciless Indian savages. That's the way it goes. We're always defending ourselves from some monster. Martians—who knows who it will [be], Right now they're having some problems because they've lost the Russians. So right through the 1980's there has been a search for some devil

who you can be frightened of, international terrorists, or Hispanic narco traffickers, or crazed Arabs, or somebody or other. But that's the way you keep a population under control. And it's not just the United States. If you're running a country and you want to frighten people, how are you going to do it? You've got to have an enemy. So somebody has got to be doing…and Japan bashing is coming along now, as an effort to try to frighten people.

END OF INTERVIEW